Why leaders choose war : the psychology of prevention / Jonathan Renshon ; foreword by Alexander L. George.

Includes bibliographical references (pages [199]-217) and index.

1. Preventive war : an introduction -- 2. Preventing what? : the Suez Canal crisis -- 3. Israel's preventive strike against Iraq -- 4. How real was "Dr. Strangelove?" : American preventive war thinking post-WWII -- 5. To the brink ... India and Pakistan's nuclear standoff -- 6. Preventive war as a grand strategy? : George W. Bush and "Operation Iraqi Freedom" -- 7. Conclusion : preventive war in perspective -- Epilogue : preventive war in the age of terrorism and rogue states.

There have been preventive wars throughout history, but the motivations behind them have remained elusive, and many crucial questions remain unanswered. What exactly constitutes preventive action? What differentiates preventive action from pre-emptive action? Are there significant differences between preventive strikes and full-on preventive wars? What is the relationship of preventive action to traditional concepts of deterrence, compellence, and international law? Finally, why do states initiate preventive action?" "Jonathan Renshon argues that the best avenue for understanding decisions to initiate preventive action is through a close examination of the individual leader responsible for such decisions. He examines five situations to pinpoint the factors that matter most in decisions to take preventive military - or not: the British action in the Suez Canal Crisis, 1956; Israel's strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor, 1981; American preventive war planning, 1946-1954; Indian preventive war planning, 1982-2002; and America's preventive war against Iraq, 2003." "In each instance, preventive action was seriously considered, and yet it only occurred in three of the five cases. In the end, each case provides further evidence that individual leadership matters - nowhere more so than in decisions involving preventive war.