Coalition politics and economic development : credibility and the strength of weak governments / Irfan Nooruddin.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Introduction -- 2. Coalition politics and economic development: theory -- 3. Coalition politics and economic development: empirics -- 4. Coalition politics and economic development: mechanisms -- 5. Coalition dharma and India shining -- 6. Developing coalitions in Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Botswana -- 7. Conclusion; Appendices.

Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics.