Political parties, business groups, and corruption in developing countries / Vineeta Yadav.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Introduction --2. Institutions, Lobbying, and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework --3. Case Studies: Legislative Institutions in Brazil and India --4. Brazil and India: Legislative Institutions and Lobbying Behavior --5. Brazil and India: Business Lobbying and Corruption --6. Legislative Institutions, Party Control, and Corruption: The Empirical Evidence -7. Conclusion

Political corruption is one of the globe's most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world in varying degrees. In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav tackles the puzzle of corruption by analyzing the role that business lobbying plays in it. She shows that the structure of a developing nation's legislative institutions frequently determines whether such institutions promote or restrain corruption. Combining focused studies of legislative institutions and business groups in India and Brazil with a broader survey of corruption in sixty four developing democracies, Yadav shows how systems with powerful parties rather than ones with powerful individual legislators encourage the most corruption. A rigorous comparative examination of the connections between political institutions, lobbying, and corruption, this work will reshape our understanding of how developing country democracies can both discourage and encourage bribery, vote buying, and influence peddling. Features Advances the controversial argument that strong legislative parties can make corruption worse, not better First treatment systematically analyzing how legislative lobbying by businesses affects corruption First study systematically exploring how design of legislative institutions influences corruption levels.