عرض عادي

Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment / Alan M. Jacobs.

بواسطة:نوع المادة : نصنصالناشر:Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011وصف:xv, 306 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 9780521195850 (hbk)
  • 0521195853 (hbk)
  • 9780521171779
  • 0521171776
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • HN28 J29 2011
المحتويات:
Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice -- Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of U.S. pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965 -- Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming U.S. pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001 -- Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term.
ملخص:This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future. In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة HN28 J29 2011 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010000404157
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة HN28 J29 2011 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.2 المتاح 30010000404100

Includes bibliographical references (pages 269-293) and index.

Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice -- Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of U.S. pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965 -- Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming U.S. pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001 -- Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term.

This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future. In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking

شارك

أبوظبي، الإمارات العربية المتحدة

reference@ecssr.ae

97124044780 +

حقوق النشر © 2024 مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية جميع الحقوق محفوظة