عرض عادي

What is meaning?/ Scott Soames.

بواسطة:المساهم (المساهمين):نوع المادة : نصنصالسلاسل:Soochow University lectures in philosophyالناشر:Princeton : Princeton University Press, [2010]تاريخ حقوق النشر: ©2010وصف:x, 132 pages : illustrations; 22 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 9780691156392
  • 9781400833948
  • 1400833949
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • B105.M4 S68 2010
المحتويات:
Meanings -- Frege and Russell: the real problem of "the unity of the proposition" -- Why truth conditions are not enough -- Propositions and attitudes: Davidson's challenge and Russell's neglected insight -- Toward a theory of propositions: a deflationary account -- The cognitive-realist theory of propositions -- Expanding the cognitive-realist model.
ملخص:The tradition descending from Frege and Russell has typically treated theories of meaning either as theories of meanings (propositions expressed), or as theories of truth conditions. However, propositions of the classical sort don't exist, and truth conditions can't provide all the information required by a theory of meaning. In this book, one of the world's leading philosophers of language offers a way out of this dilemma. Traditionally conceived, propositions are denizens of a "third realm" beyond mind and matter, "grasped" by mysterious Platonic intuition. As conceived here, they are cognit.
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة B105.M4 S68 2010 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010011138052
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة B105.M4 S68 2010 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.2 المتاح 30010011138053

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Meanings -- Frege and Russell: the real problem of "the unity of the proposition" -- Why truth conditions are not enough -- Propositions and attitudes: Davidson's challenge and Russell's neglected insight -- Toward a theory of propositions: a deflationary account -- The cognitive-realist theory of propositions -- Expanding the cognitive-realist model.

The tradition descending from Frege and Russell has typically treated theories of meaning either as theories of meanings (propositions expressed), or as theories of truth conditions. However, propositions of the classical sort don't exist, and truth conditions can't provide all the information required by a theory of meaning. In this book, one of the world's leading philosophers of language offers a way out of this dilemma. Traditionally conceived, propositions are denizens of a "third realm" beyond mind and matter, "grasped" by mysterious Platonic intuition. As conceived here, they are cognit.

شارك

أبوظبي، الإمارات العربية المتحدة

reference@ecssr.ae

97124044780 +

حقوق النشر © 2024 مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية جميع الحقوق محفوظة