Human rights and human well-being / William J. Talbott.
نوع المادة : نصالسلاسل:Oxford political philosophyالناشر:Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2010وصف:xi, 410 pages ; 25 cmنوع المحتوى:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 9780195173482
- 0195173481
- JC571 .T14445 2010
نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
كتاب | UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | JC571 .T14445 2010 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30020000048041 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
JC571 .S855 2019 حقوق الإنسان في النص المسرحي المعاصر / | JC571 .S87 2012 اتفاقية حقوق الطفل / | JC571 .S87 2012 اتفاقية حقوق الطفل / | JC571 .T14445 2010 Human rights and human well-being / | JC571 T33 1989 مبادئ تدريس حقوق الانسان : انشطة عملية للمدارس الابتدائية والثانوية | JC571 T35 2000 تمكين المستضعف : نحو منظور عربي لتعليم ونشر ثقافة حقوق الانسان / | JC571 T352 2006 حقوق الانسان و حرياته الاساسية / |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 389-400) and index.
The consequentialist project for human rights -- Exceptions to libertarian natural rights -- The main principle -- What is well-being? What is equity? -- The two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy -- Security rights -- Epistemological foundations for the priority of autonomy rights -- The millian epistemological argument for autonomy rights -- Property rights, contract rights, and other economic rights -- Democratic rights -- Equity rights -- The most reliable judgment standard for soft, legal paternalism -- Liberty rights and privacy rights -- Clarifications and responses to objections.
From the publisher. What is moral progress? In this book, William Talbott offers a surprising answer to that question. He proposes a consequentialist meta-theoretical principle of moral and legal progress, the "main principle," to explain why these changes are examples of moral and legal progress. On Talbott's account, improvements to our moral or legal practices are changes that, when evaluated as a practice, contribute to equitably promoting well-being. Talbott uses the main principle to explain why almost all the substantive moral norms and principles used in moral or legal reasoning have exceptions and why it is almost inevitable that, no matter how much we improve them, there will always be more exceptions. This explanation enables Talbott to propose a new, non-skeptical understanding of what has been called the "naturalistic fallacy." Talbott uses the main principle to complete the project begun in his 2005 book of identifying the human rights that should be universal-that is, legally guaranteed in all human societies. Talbott identifies a list of fourteen robust, inalienable human rights. Talbott contrasts his consequentialist (though not utilitarian) account with many of the most influential nonconsequentialist accounts of morality and justice in the philosophical literature, including those of Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, Phillip Pettit, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, Amartya Sen, and Judith Thomson.