Frege's detour : an essay on meaning, reference, and truth / John Perry.
نوع المادة : نصالسلاسل:Cocoالناشر:New york : Oxford University Press, 2019وصف:145 pages ; 24 cmنوع المحتوى:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 9780198812821
- B3245.F24 P47 2019
نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
كتاب | UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | B3245.F24 P47 2019 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30020000053031 | ||
كتاب | UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | B3245.F24 P47 2019 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.2 | المتاح | 30020000053030 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
B3245.F24 K54 2011 Frege and the logic of sense and reference / | B3245.F24 K54 2011 Frege and the logic of sense and reference / | B3245.F24 P47 2019 Frege's detour : an essay on meaning, reference, and truth / | B3245.F24 P47 2019 Frege's detour : an essay on meaning, reference, and truth / | B3245.F24 Q37 2001 في الفكر الفلسفي المعاصر : رؤية علمية | B3245.F24 Q37 2001 في الفكر الفلسفي المعاصر : رؤية علمية | B3245.F24 S58 2009 Gottlob Frege / |
"I argue that Frege's treatment of propositional attitudes in ``On Sense and Reference" put the philosophy of language on a detour. His doctrine of ``indirect reference" reflected and reinforced the view that beliefs, desires, etc. consist in having relations to propositions. According to this doctrine expressions in embedded sentences in indirect discourse and propositional attitude reports do refer as they do when unembedded, but instead refer to their ordinary senses, so sentences refer to Thoughts, Frege's version of what are now callled general or qualitative propositions. Davidson call this move abandoning ``semantic innocence" which is the view that such embedded sentences work as they usually do. I agree with Davidson, that semantic innocence should not be abandonned. I argue that such cognitive states have truth-conditions in virtue of their causal and informational roles, which can be encoded in a variety of ways for different purposes, and provide a better explanation of the considerations that drove Frege to abandon innocence. I trace the problems I see to Frege's abandonment of the framework of his early work, the Begriffsschrift. I argue that by adding the levels of senses and Thoughts to his Begriffsschrift framework, and retaining ``circumstances" as the referents of sentences containing singular terms, Frege could have avoided the doctrine of indirect reference, and philosophy could have taken a different path"-- Provided by publisher.