In good form : arguing for epistemic norms of credence / Leszek Wroński

Includes bibliographical references (pages 173-182)

Machine generated contents note: I. Some basic issues in formal epistemology -- 1. A few motivational examples -- 1.1. "Proofs" which are not really proofs -- 1.2. Arguing using undefined structures -- 1.2.1. Undefined structures, implicit quantification: the Qualified Reflection Principle -- 1.2.2. Conclusions about structures which are undefined: arguing about chance propositions -- 1.3. Not really reading what one cites -- 1.4. Misquote a classic, no one notices -- 2. The Dutch Book Theorem and Argument -- 2.1. The Dutch Book Theorem and why it holds -- 2.1.1. Proving the (Converse) Dutch Book Theorem -- 2.2. The Dutch Book Argument and why it fails -- 2.3. On two notions of expected value used in the literature -- 3. The Principal Principle, Best Systems and Humean Supervenience -- 3.1. Admissibility -- first observations -- 3.2. "Aboutness" and undermining -- 3.3. The Big Bad Bug: the Best System may be weaker than you think -- 4. A few remarks on higher-order probabilities -- 4.1. Updating on learning a chance of a proposition: a negative result -- 4.2. Higher-order probabilities as expert functions: a construction -- 4.2.1. Questions -- II. Measuring the value of one's credal state -- 5. A case for Inverse Relative Entropy -- 5.1. Belief update methods and rules -- 5.1.1. Methods -- 5.1.2. Rules -- 5.2. The Judy Benjamin problem -- 5.3. The Simultaneous Update problem -- 5.3.1. How QUM approaches the problem -- 5.3.2. Cardinality dependence and fine-graining -- 5.3.3. The MIRE solution to the problem -- 5.4. (Intermediate) conclusions -- 5.5. The symmetric Judy Benjamin Problem, or learning from conditionals whose antecedents form a partition -- 5.5.1. The symmetric Judy Benjamin problem, generalized -- 5.5.2. The uniform prior -- 5.5.3. A nonuniform prior -- 5.6. Inverse Relative Entropy is a Bregman Divergence -- 5.6.1. Relation to Kullback-Leibler divergence and/-divergences -- 5.6.2. (Less intermediate) conclusions -- 6. Regarding the Brier Score -- 6.1. Against: the elimination counterexamples -- 6.1.1. Uniform imaging -- 6.1.2. The case of the 12 drawers -- 6.1.3. Credences over Boolean algebras -- 6.1.4. Elimination counterexamples: summary -- 6.2. For: strengthening the arguments from the Ought-Can Principle -- 6.2.1. The framework and the shared assumptions -- 6.2.2. The argument from the "Discursive Dilemma" -- 6.2.3. The argument from separability of global inaccuracy -- 6.2.4. The argument from directed urgency