The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives / edite by S. Paul Kapur, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Diana Wueger.

Intro -- Foreword by Ambassador Rakesh Sood -- An Indian Perspective -- Foreword by Dr. Christopher Ford -- A U.S. Perspective -- Acknowledgement -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Mitigating Insider Threats -- 1.2 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 1.3 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 1.4 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 1.5 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 1.6 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Mitigating Insider Threats and Ensuring Personnel Reliability -- 2.1 An Indian Perspective -- 2.1.1 Why and How Significant Is the Insider Threat? -- 2.1.2 India's Insider Threat Challenge -- 2.1.3 Indian Approach to Addressing Insider Threat -- 2.1.4 Challenges of Ensuring Trustworthiness -- 2.1.5 Are There Solutions and Measures That Can Be Taken? -- 2.1.6 Conclusion -- 2.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 2.2.1 Defining the Insider Threat -- 2.2.2 Introduction to Insider Threats -- 2.2.3 Trustworthiness/Reliability Programs -- 2.2.4 Mitigating Insider Threats with Technical Measures -- 2.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 3.1 An Indian Perspective -- 3.1.1 Basics Aspects of Culture -- 3.1.2 Organizational Culture -- 3.1.3 Nuclear Security Culture -- 3.1.4 Bridging the Gap Between Nuclear Safety and Security Culture -- 3.2 Nuclear Security Management Structure of the Organization -- 3.2.1 Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability at Each Level of the Organization -- 3.2.2 Security Culture Assessment -- 3.2.3 System of Self-Assessment -- 3.2.4 Reporting of Security Incidents -- 3.2.5 Personnel Reliability Programmes -- 3.2.6 Effective Security Culture: -- 3.3 India's Approach to Nuclear Security -- 3.3.1 Key Legislations.

3.3.2 Physical Security -- 3.3.3 Cybersecurity -- 3.3.4 Emergency Response System -- 3.3.5 Establishment of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership -- 3.3.6 Holes in the Security Wall -- 3.3.7 Conclusion -- 3.4 A U.S. Perspective -- 3.4.1 Incorporating Lessons Learned -- 3.4.1.1 Communicating Concerns Builds Understanding -- 3.4.1.2 Taking Steps for Action -- 3.4.2 Nuclear Security from the Workforce to the Community -- 3.4.3 Defining Common Language, Values, and Standards -- 3.4.4 Y-12 Case Study -- 3.4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 4.1 An Indian Perspective -- 4.1.1 Public Relations -- 4.1.1.1 Communications -- 4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication -- 4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP -- 4.1.2 Crisis Communication -- 4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making -- 4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels -- 4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.4 Conclusions -- 4.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure -- 4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities -- 4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds -- 4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response -- 4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities -- 4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes -- 4.2.7 Crisis Communications -- 4.2.8 Case Studies -- 4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979) -- 4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011) -- 4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges -- 4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership -- 4.2.13 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 5.1 An Indian Perspective -- 5.1.1 Components of Physical Protection Regime and Indian Commitments -- 5.1.2 Considerations for Designing a PPS -- 5.1.3 Nuclear Security and Physical Protection in India: An Overview.

5.1.3.1 Historical Perspective -- 5.1.3.2 Security Architecture in India: General Considerations -- 5.1.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response -- 5.1.3.4 The Role of Technology in Nuclear Security in India -- 5.1.4 Security of Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities -- 5.1.5 Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials -- 5.1.5.1 Security of Radioactive Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.2 Security of Nuclear Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.3 Special Security Measures -- 5.1.6 Conclusion and Future Initiatives -- 5.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 5.2.1 DEPO Method Overview -- 5.2.2 Applying the DEPO Method -- 5.2.3 Defining System Requirements -- 5.2.3.1 Asset(s) Under Protection -- 5.2.3.2 Defining System Constraints and Restraints -- 5.2.3.3 Defining the Threat -- 5.2.4 Design: Delay, Detection, and Response -- 5.2.4.1 Detection -- 5.2.4.2 Delay -- 5.2.4.3 Response -- 5.2.4.4 Evaluate -- 5.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 6.1 An Indian Perspective -- 6.1.1 Introduction -- 6.1.2 Control and Security of Radioactive Sources in Major Areas of Their Applications -- 6.1.2.1 Industrial Gamma Radiography (IR) Sources and Practices -- 6.1.2.2 Irradiator Plants (Gamma Radiation Plants) -- 6.1.2.3 Radiotherapy: RI Sources and Systems for Cancer Care -- 6.1.2.4 Other Areas of RI Source Applications -- 6.1.2.5 Human Element/Factor-Related Aspects -- 6.1.2.6 'Legacy Source'-Related Events and Lessons -- 6.1.3 Production of RI-Based Sources and Operation of Radiation Technology Facilities/Services-Indian Experiences with Control of Sources -- 6.1.4 Strengthening Measures to Control the Use of Radioactive Sources and to Foster Alternative Technologies -- 6.1.4.1 Alternative Technologies to the Use of Radioactive Sources-Existing, Emerging, and Under-Development Options -- 6.1.4.2 Medical Application Sources.

6.1.4.3 Industrial Application and Research Sources -- 6.1.4.4 Envisaged Areas of Continuity in RI Source Applications -- 6.1.5 Control of Radioactive Sources-Continuing Challenges and Path Forward -- 6.1.6 Recommendations -- 6.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 6.2.1 Overview: The Regulatory Framework in the United States -- 6.2.1.1 Federal Regulators: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- 6.2.1.2 State-Level Regulation: "Agreement State" Compacts -- 6.2.1.3 Agreements with the Armed Forces -- 6.2.2 Challenges Within the Framework -- 6.2.2.1 Compatible vs. Identical Regulations -- 6.2.2.2 Prescriptive vs. Performance-Based Criteria -- 6.2.3 An Emerging Consensus: Permanent Risk Reduction -- 6.2.3.1 The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP) -- 6.2.3.2 Collaborations with Diverse Stakeholders -- 6.2.3.3 Elimination of Nuclear Threat Networks to National Security -- 6.2.4 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Facilities -- 7.1 An Indian Perspective -- 7.1.1 Identifying Risks and Vulnerabilities -- 7.1.2 Cybersecurity in India: An Overview -- 7.1.3 India's Cyber and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 7.1.4 Case Study: The Kudankulam Breach -- 7.1.5 Important Considerations and Recommendations -- 7.1.6 Conclusion -- 7.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 7.2.1 Background -- 7.2.2 Threat Agents and Vulnerabilities -- 7.2.3 U.S. Regulatory Approach -- 7.2.4 Potential Risks from a Cyberattack -- 7.2.5 Defense and Response -- 7.2.6 Supply-Chain Security -- 7.2.7 Assessing Cybersecurity -- 7.2.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Index.

This Open Access volume assembles experts from the United States and India to examine six issues essential to the safety and security of nuclear facilities, technologies, and materials: insider threats, organizational culture, emergency response, physical protection, control of radioactive sources, and cyber security. Each chapter includes papers by an Indian expert and by an American counterpart. This unique structure contrasts the countries' diverse perspectives on nuclear security, situates technical problems within larger socio-political contexts, and identifies cooperative opportunities for the U.S. and India. S. Paul Kapur is Professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School and a visiting fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Diana Wueger is Faculty Associate for Research in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School and a PhD Candidate at the University of Chicago.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.