عرض عادي

The strategy of conflict / Thomas C. Schelling.

بواسطة:نوع المادة : نصنصالناشر:Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1980الطبعات:2nd edوصف:vii, 309 pages : illustrations ; 22 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 0674840313
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • BF637.N4 S3 1980
المحتويات:
I: Elements of a theory of strategy. The retarded science of international strategy -- An essay on bargaining -- Bargaining, communication, and limited war -- II: A reorientation of game theory. Toward a theory of interdependent decision -- Enforcement, communication, and strategic moves -- Game theory and experimental research -- III: Strategy with a random ingredient. Randomization of promises and threats -- The threat that leaves something to chance -- IV: Surprise attack : a study in mutual distrust. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack -- Surprise attack and disarmament -- Appendices: Nuclear weapons and limited war ; For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory ; Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "noncooperative" games.
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة BF637.N4 S3 1980 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010000090998

"With a new preface by the author"--cover.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

I: Elements of a theory of strategy. The retarded science of international strategy -- An essay on bargaining -- Bargaining, communication, and limited war -- II: A reorientation of game theory. Toward a theory of interdependent decision -- Enforcement, communication, and strategic moves -- Game theory and experimental research -- III: Strategy with a random ingredient. Randomization of promises and threats -- The threat that leaves something to chance -- IV: Surprise attack : a study in mutual distrust. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack -- Surprise attack and disarmament -- Appendices: Nuclear weapons and limited war ; For the abandonment of symmetry in game theory ; Re-interpretation of a solution concept for "noncooperative" games.

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