A contribution to the pure theory of taxation / Roger Guesnerie.
نوع المادة :
نصالسلاسل:Econometric Society monographs ;no ; 25الناشر:Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995وصف:xv, 299 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmنوع المحتوى:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 0521236894 (hbk)
- HJ2305 G84 1995
| نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
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كتاب
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UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | HJ2305 G84 1995 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30010000084762 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
| HJ2305 .F86 2013 Fundamentals of taxation 2013 / | HJ2305 .F86 2013 Fundamentals of taxation 2013 / | HJ2305 .F86 2013 Fundamentals of taxation 2013 / | HJ2305 G84 1995 A contribution to the pure theory of taxation / | HJ2305 H35 1995 Taxation policy and practice / | HJ2305 J328 1998 A dictionary of taxation / | HJ2305 J33 1996 The economics of taxation : principles, policy, and practice / |
Series statement from jacket.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 283-292) and index.
1. Institutional economics of taxation -- 2. Positive economics: the structure of tax equilibria -- 3. Normative economics of taxation: reform and optimization -- 4. Normative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform -- 5. Political economics of taxation.
This book investigates the way in which tax systems affect economic efficiency and the distribution of welfare. It examines within a unified framework questions that are usually treated in different areas of the literature: institutional economics, positive economics, normative economics, and political economics. It adheres to the rigorous standards of pure theory while paying careful attention to the policy relevance of the arguments.
Tax systems are viewed as information extracting devices that generate sets of equilibria of complex geometry. A tax reform methodology is proposed that sheds light on optimal taxes. Social conflicts in the determination of taxes are shown to have effects on social cohesion.
