Cooperative models in international relations research / edited by Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher.
نوع المادة :
نصالناشر:Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994وصف:viii, 385 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmنوع المحتوى:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 0792393945 (hbk)
- JX1291 C628 1994
| نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
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كتاب
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UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | JX1291 C628 1994 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30010000118173 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
| JX1291 .A45 2013 تحليل العلاقات الدولية : دراسة في إدارة الصراع الدولي / | JX1291 .B89 1993 The logic of anarchy : neorealism to structural realism | JX1291 .C483 1990 The scientific measurement of international conflict : handbook of datasets on crises and wars, 1495-1988 A.D. | JX1291 C628 1994 Cooperative models in international relations research / | JX1291 .D4812 1982 JX1291 .D4812 1982 "تحليل العلاقات الدولية / | JX1291 .D4812 1982 JX1291 .D4812 1982 "تحليل العلاقات الدولية / | JX1291 .F66 Foreign policy analysis |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Introduction: Cooperative Models in International Relations Research / Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher -- I. Game Theory and Cooperation: General Aspects. 1. Sources in Game Theory for International Relations Specialists / Barry O'Neill. 2. On Coalition Games / Martin Shubik. 3. From Conflict to Cooperation in the Study of International Security / Michael D. Intriligator. 4. A Theory of Cooperation in the Triad / Urs Luterbacher -- II. Game Theory and Cooperation: Specific Applications. 5. International Cooperation Among Relative-Gains Maximizers / Duncan Snidal. 6. The Problem of Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory / Robert Powell. 7. Implementation Through Sequential Unanimity Games / Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont -- III. Deterrence. 8. Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World / Barry Nalebuff. 9. A Question of Procedure at the Vienna Arms Talks / Barry O'Neill -- IV. Escalation and Crises.
10. Limited Nuclear Options and the Dynamics of Escalation / Robert Powell. 11. Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining / James D. Morrow. 12. Are Crises Rational? A Game-Theoretic Analysis / Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour -- V. Other Approaches to Modeling International Cooperation. 13. The Origin of Games: A Theory of the Formation of Ordinal Preferences and Games / Vinod K. Aggarwal and Pierre Allan. 14. An Economic Analysis of Cooperation in the European Community / S. Weber and H. Wiesmeth. 15. Labor Relations in International Comparison, or Why Humans (and Nations) Sometimes Cooperate and Sometimes Don't / Jean-Christian Lambelet.
