The future's back : nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability after the Cold War / Frank P. Harvey.

Includes bibliographical references (pages [171]-188) and index.

1. Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions -- 2. Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing -- 3. New Directions for Aggregate Testing -- 4. Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88 -- 5. U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence -- 6. Nuclear Stability after the Cold War -- 7. Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War.

The Future's Back provides a valuable framework for organizing and evaluating research on superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence.

Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are unconvincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises.

This "crises"-based data set serves as a basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.