Building the Cold War consensus : the political economy of U.S. national security policy, 1949-51 / Benjamin O. Fordham.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 207-251) and indexes.

Ch. 1. The Domestic Political Economy and U.S. National Security Policy -- Ch. 2. The Politics of Rearmament in the Executive Branch I: The Fiscal 1951 Budget -- Ch. 3. The Politics of Rearmament in the Executive Branch II: NSC 68 and Rearmament -- Ch. 4. The Political and Economic Sources of Divergent Foreign Policy Preferences in the Senate, 1949-51 -- Ch. 5. The Conflictual Politics of Consensus Building I: Korea, Rearmament, and the End of the Fair Deal -- Ch. 6. The Conflictual Politics of Consensus Building II: The Development of the Internal Security Program -- Ch. 7. The Conflictual Politics of Consensus Building III: Rearmament and the Red Scare -- Ch. 8. Conclusion: Domestic Politics and Theories of National Security Policy.

Using a statistical analysis of the economic sources of support and opposition to the Truman administration's foreign policy and a historical account of the crucial period between the summer of 1949 and the winter of 1951, Fordham integrates the political struggle over NSC 68, the decision to intervene in the Korean War, and congressional debates over the Fair Deal, McCarthyism, and military spending.

The Truman administration's policy was politically successful not only because it appealed to internationally oriented sectors of the U.S. economy, but also because it was linked to domestic policies favored by domestically oriented, labor-sensitive sectors that would otherwise have opposed it.