Democratic institutional design : the powers and incentives of Venezuelan politicians and interest groups / Brian F. Crisp.
نوع المادة : نصالناشر:Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, [2000]تاريخ حقوق النشر: copyright 2000وصف:xviii, 273 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmنوع المحتوى:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 0804735700 (hbk)
- 9780804735704
- JL3831 C74 2000
نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
كتاب | UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | JL3831 C74 2000 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30010000111882 | ||
كتاب | UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | JL3831 C74 2000 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.2 | المتاح | 30010000111881 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
Includes bibliographical references (pages 249-265) and index.
1. Studying Democratic Institutions in Venezuela -- 2. The Electoral System's Impact on the Role of Congress in the Policy-Making Process -- 3. The President's Legislative Role: The Initiation of Legislation and Presidential Decree Authority -- 4. Influencing the Executive Branch During Policy Formation: Consultative Commissions -- 5. Participating in the Execution of Policy: The Decentralized Public Administration -- 6. Institutionalized Dominance and Its Dynamics: The Relative Participation of Business and Labor -- 7. The Policy Impact: The Economic Development Strategy and Patterns of Government Spending -- 8. Political Institutions, Crisis, and Reform -- 9. Venezuelan Institutional Design in Comparative Perspective -- Postscript: The 2000 Constitution.