The diplomacy of war : the case of Korea / Graeme S. Mount, with Andre Laferriere.

Includes bibliographical references (pages [190]-196) and index.

Ch. 1. Should there be elections only in South Korea? -- Ch. 2. How extensive should the commonwealth commitment be, and how far north should the United Nations command go? -- Ch. 3. Did the "old commonwealth" leaders persuade President Truman not to use the atomic bomb in Korea? : were they wise to challenge U.S. policy toward China? -- Ch. 4. What should have been the cease-fire terms? -- Ch. 5. Post-war problems and the commonwealth's response.

"In 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Sixteen nations fought on behalf of South Korea; two (the People's Republic of China and North Korea itself) on behalf of North Korea. By the time the fighting stopped, three years later, nearly two million military, and an estimated three million civilians had lost their lives, with one-half of Korean industry, and one-third of Korean homes destroyed. For two of the three years that the war was under way, both sides were trying to negotiate a peace." "Canadian governments know that official Washington usually does not appreciate Canadian advice on management of the world. Ottawa responds by joining multinational organizations, where it attempts to persuade other governments to establish a common front. The common front may then try, by force of numbers, to influence the White House and the State Department. One such multinational organization is the Commonwealth, five of whose eight members (the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) had combat forces in Korea. Using sources from Australia, Canada, China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States, Mount and Laferriere have used the Korean War as a case study. When did the Commonwealth belligerents agree with each other but not with official Washington, and what success did they have in changing U.S. policies?"--BOOK JACKET.