عرض عادي

Shadows of things past and images of the future : lessons for the insurgencies in our midst / Max G. Manwaring.

بواسطة:نوع المادة : نصنصالسلاسل:Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 21st century. Special seriesالناشر:Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College [2004]وصف:vi, 51 pages ; 23 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 1584871784 (pbk)
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • HV6433.S63 M279 2004
ملخص:This monograph begins with a short discussion of contemporary insurgency. It makes the argument that, in studying terror war, guerrilla war, or any other common term for insurgency war, we find these expressions mischaracterize the activities of armed groups that are attempting to gain political control of a nation-state. The fact is that these organizations are engaged in a highly complexpolitical-psychological war. Three key harbinger cases from which the first contemporary lessons of modern insurgency should have been learned provide the basis for the argument--Peru (1962 to date), Italy (1968-82), and Argentina (1969-79). Given that these kinds of conflict--or mutations--are likely to continue to challenge U.S. and other global leadership over the next several years, it is important to understand them. In this connection, it is also important to understand that the final results of insurgency or counterinsurgency are never determinedby arms alone. Rather, a successful counterinsurgency depends on a holi
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نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة HV6433.S63 M279 2004 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010000160563
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة HV6433.S63 M279 2004 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.2 المتاح 30010000160507

"November 2004."

This monograph begins with a short discussion of contemporary insurgency. It makes the argument that, in studying terror war, guerrilla war, or any other common term for insurgency war, we find these expressions mischaracterize the activities of armed groups that are attempting to gain political control of a nation-state. The fact is that these organizations are engaged in a highly complexpolitical-psychological war. Three key harbinger cases from which the first contemporary lessons of modern insurgency should have been learned provide the basis for the argument--Peru (1962 to date), Italy (1968-82), and Argentina (1969-79). Given that these kinds of conflict--or mutations--are likely to continue to challenge U.S. and other global leadership over the next several years, it is important to understand them. In this connection, it is also important to understand that the final results of insurgency or counterinsurgency are never determinedby arms alone. Rather, a successful counterinsurgency depends on a holi

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