The Blitzkrieg myth : how Hitler and the Allies misread the strategic realities of World War II / John Mosier.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction: New Theories of Warfare -- 1. War as Pseudoscience: 1920-1939 -- 2. The Maginot Line and Hitler's Response -- 3. The Tank Production Myths -- 4. Lessons Mislearned: Poland and the Winter Wars -- 5. The Germans and the Allies Prepare of War -- 6. The German Assault and the Fall of France: May-June 1940 -- 7. The Uses and Misuses of Armor: North Africa, Italy, the Eastern Front -- 8. The Failure of Strategic Airpower: 1940-1944 -- 9. Normandy and the Breakout at Saint-Lo: Summer 1944 -- 10. The Breakthrough Failures: Arnhem, Metz, Bastogne -- 11. Conclusion: The Persistence of Failed Ideas.

"The great myth of the First World War was that defense was all-powerful. In the interwar years, a new myth appeared - that the new technology of the airplane and the tank would result in rapid and massive breakthroughs on the battlefield, with the enemy being destroyed in weeks." "John Mosier shows how Hitler, Rommel, von Manstein, Montgomery, and Patton were all equally seduced by the breakthrough myth, or blitzkrieg, as the decisive way to victory. He shows how the Polish campaign in the autumn of 1939 and the fall of France in the spring of 1940 were not blitzkrieg victories. He also reinterprets Rommel's North African campaigns, D day, the Normandy campaign, and Hitler's last desperate breakthrough effort to Antwerp in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, among others. All these actions saw the clash of breakthrough theories with the realities of conventional military tactics."--BOOK JACKET.