Washington's war : the American war of independence to the Iraqi insurgency / Michael Rose.
نوع المادة :![نص](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 1933648775 (hbk)
- 9781933648774 (hbk)
- E230 R67 2008
نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() |
UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | E230 R67 2008 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30010000031960 | ||
![]() |
UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | E230 R67 2008 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.2 | المتاح | 30010000031959 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-212) and index.
General Sir Michael Rose exposes a grim reality: Iraqi insurgents have adopted the same guerrilla warfare tactics used during the American Revolution. George Washington commanded a ragtag, undisciplined band of rebels, yet their revolution ended with an American victory. Washington succeeded in defeating the most powerful army in the world--not by engaging in conventional warfare, at which the British excelled, but by waging an insurgency campaign of ambush and indirect attacks. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq, and in the followed years, America has found itself fighting a widespread popular insurrection with an army trained for conventional warfare. Like King George and his advisers, President Bush and his cabinet misunderstood the nature of the problem. The British Army learned from its mistakes to remain a dominant world power; the Americans, by contrast, seem to be forgetting the lessons of their founding fathers.--From publisher description.