Sustaining U.S. nuclear submarine design capabilities / John F. Schank ... [and others].
نوع المادة :![نص](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 9780833041609 (pbk.)
- 0833041606 (pbk.)
- V858 S87 2007
نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
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UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | V858 S87 2007 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30010000301581 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
V857.5 C65 2002 A concept of operations for a new deep-diving submarine / | V857.5 H83 2002 K-19 : the widowmaker : the secret story of the Soviet nuclear submarine/ | V857.5 H83 2002 K-19 : the widowmaker : the secret story of the Soviet nuclear submarine/ | V858 S87 2007 Sustaining U.S. nuclear submarine design capabilities / | V858 S8712 2007 Sustaining U.S. nuclear submarine design capabilities : executive summary / John F. Schank ... [et al.]. | V859.A8 W44 1992 Australian Submarines : a history / | V859.G3 B57 2006 Kriegsmarine U-boats 1939-45 / |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-201).
Introduction -- The submarine design process -- Framing the analysis -- Effect of different options for managing design resources -- Critical skills -- Suppliers -- The Navy's roles and responsibilities in submarine design -- Effect of a design gap on the Navy's technical community -- Conclusions and recommendations -- Appendixes: A. Workforce simulation model -- B. Survey instrument for electric boat and Northrop Grumman Newport news -- C. Survey instrument provided to vendors -- D. U.S. Navy's technical warrant holders -- E. Net present value analysis.
For the first time since the design of the first nuclear submarine, the U.S. Navy has no nuclear design program under way, which raises the possibility that design capability could be lost. Such a loss could result in higher costs and delays when the next submarine design is undertaken, as well as risks to system performance and safety. The authors estimate and compare the costs and delays of letting design capability erode vs. those of alternative means of managing the workload and workforce over the gap in design demand and beyond. The authors recommend that the Navy consider stretching out the deign of the next submarine class and starting it early, or,if that seems too risky, sustaining design resources that the shipyards, their vendors, and in the Navy itself that exceed those supported by the demand.