Organizations at war in Afghanistan and beyond / Abdulkader H. Sinno.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 317-329) and index.

1. Organizing to Win -- Pt. 1. An Organizational Theory of Group Conflict -- 2. Organization and the Outcome of Conflicts -- 3. Advantages and Limitations of Structures -- 4. The Gist of the Organizational Theory -- Pt. 2. Explaining the Outcomes of Afghan Conflicts -- 5. The Soviet Withdrawal frorn Afghanistan -- 6. Resilience through Division, 1979-1989 -- 7. The Cost of the Failure to Restructure, 1989-1994 -- 8. The Rise of the Taliban, 1994-2001 -- 9. Afghan Conflicts under U.S. Occupation, 2001- -- Pt. 3. And Beyond -- 10. The Organizational Theory beyond Afghanistan -- Participants in Post-1978 Afghan Conflicts.

"Employing a wide range of sources, including his own fieldwork in Afghanistan and statistical data on conflicts across the region, Sinno contends that in Afghanistan, the groups that have outperformed and outlasted their opponents have done so because of their successful organization. Each organization's ability to mobilize effectively, execute strategy, coordinate efforts, manage disunity, and process information depends on how well its structure matches its ability to keep its riyals at bay. Centralized organizations, Sinno finds, are generally more effective than noncentralized ones, but noncentralized ones are more resilient absent a safe haven, Sinno's organizational theory explains otherwise puzzling behavior found in group conflicts: the longevity of unpopular regimes, the demise of popular movements, and efforts of those who share a common cause to undermine their ideological or ethnic kin. The author argues that the organizational theory applies not only to Afghanistan - where he doubts the effectiveness of American state-building efforts - but also to other ethnic, revolutionary, independence, and secessionist conflicts in North Africa, the Middle East, and beyond."--BOOK JACKET.