عرض عادي

The hardest victory : RAF Bomber Command in the Second World Warr / Denis Richards.

بواسطة:نوع المادة : نصنصالناشر:London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1994وصف:xix, 393 pages, [24] pages of plates ; bill., maps ; 25 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 0340563451 (hbk)
  • 9780340563458 (hbk)
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • D786 R488 1994
المحتويات:
Small beginnings -- Order of battle -- Experience teaches -- Against the tide: Norway -- Against the flood: France -- The flood stemmed: Britain -- The means of victory? -- T̀ransportation and Morale' -- Low point: new hopes: new commander -- Spring offensive, 1942 -- M̀illennium' -- Policy and the USAAF -- The advent of the pathfinders -- Towards the main offensive -- T̀he Battle of the Ruhr' -- Mining: 2 group: P̀ointblank' -- Hamburg: Italy: Peenemünde -- T̀he Battle of Berlin' -- Prelude to Òverlord' -- Normandy and the V-weapons -- The last autumn ---- The Ardennes: oil: Dresden -- Victory -- Retrospect -- Fifty years on: the crews remember.
ملخص:Richards (coauthor of The Battle of Britain) here writes of how British Bomber Command developed a force of immense power and effectiveness during WWII. Adhering to a general policy of night bombing, Royal Air Force bombers had little success in hitting precise targets such as individual factories. But from mid-1941 on, as Richards shows, they concentrated on industrial areas, which in effect meant major towns, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. He describes how Bomber Command made its first serious impact on the German homeland with the raid on Lubeck (March 28-29, 1942), followed by the awesome thousand-bomber raids and the systematic devastation of Berlin. In 1943, the U.S. Air Force joined the air assault on Germany, providing long-range fighter escorts that enabled British bombers to operate over Germany by day. Richards challenges those who believe the American tactic of precise bombing as opposed to area bombing was morally superior by documenting that the results were similar. Further, he clears up a long-standing misconception about Bomber Command's chief, Air Marshall Arthur Harris, proving that Harris neither initiated nor was responsible for maintaining the area bombing policy. Photos. (Apr.)
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة D786 R488 1994 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010000267790

"A John Curtis book."

Includes bibliographical references (pages 364-373) and index.

Small beginnings -- Order of battle -- Experience teaches -- Against the tide: Norway -- Against the flood: France -- The flood stemmed: Britain -- The means of victory? -- T̀ransportation and Morale' -- Low point: new hopes: new commander -- Spring offensive, 1942 -- M̀illennium' -- Policy and the USAAF -- The advent of the pathfinders -- Towards the main offensive -- T̀he Battle of the Ruhr' -- Mining: 2 group: P̀ointblank' -- Hamburg: Italy: Peenemünde -- T̀he Battle of Berlin' -- Prelude to Òverlord' -- Normandy and the V-weapons -- The last autumn ---- The Ardennes: oil: Dresden -- Victory -- Retrospect -- Fifty years on: the crews remember.

Richards (coauthor of The Battle of Britain) here writes of how British Bomber Command developed a force of immense power and effectiveness during WWII. Adhering to a general policy of night bombing, Royal Air Force bombers had little success in hitting precise targets such as individual factories. But from mid-1941 on, as Richards shows, they concentrated on industrial areas, which in effect meant major towns, resulting in heavy civilian casualties. He describes how Bomber Command made its first serious impact on the German homeland with the raid on Lubeck (March 28-29, 1942), followed by the awesome thousand-bomber raids and the systematic devastation of Berlin. In 1943, the U.S. Air Force joined the air assault on Germany, providing long-range fighter escorts that enabled British bombers to operate over Germany by day. Richards challenges those who believe the American tactic of precise bombing as opposed to area bombing was morally superior by documenting that the results were similar. Further, he clears up a long-standing misconception about Bomber Command's chief, Air Marshall Arthur Harris, proving that Harris neither initiated nor was responsible for maintaining the area bombing policy. Photos. (Apr.)

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