Losing small wars : British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan / Frank Ledwidge.
نوع المادة : نصالناشر:New Haven : Yale University Press, [2011]تاريخ حقوق النشر: copyright 2011وصف:viii, 308 pages ; 25 cmنوع المحتوى:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 9780300166712 (hbk)
- 0300166710 (hbk)
- Iraq War, 2003- -- Participation, British
- Iraq War, 2003- -- Campaigns -- Iraq -- Baٍsrah
- Afghan War, 2001- -- Participation, British
- Afghan War, 2001- -- Campaigns -- Afghanistan -- Helmand River Valley
- Strategic culture -- Great Britain
- Great Britain -- Armed Forces -- Management
- Great Britain -- Military policy
- DS79.765.G7 L44 2011
نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
كتاب | UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | DS79.765.G7 L44 2011 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30010000400386 | ||
كتاب | UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة | DS79.765.G7 L44 2011 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | C.2 | المتاح | 30010000400391 |
Browsing UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات shelves, Shelving location: General Collection | المجموعات العامة إغلاق مستعرض الرف(يخفي مستعرض الرف)
DS79.764.U6 Z45 2004 Three block war : U.S. Marines in Iraq / | DS79.765.G7 F35 2011 A war of choice : the British in Iraq 2003-9 / | DS79.765.G7 L44 2011 Losing small wars : British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan / | DS79.765.G7 L44 2011 Losing small wars : British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan / | DS79.765.G7 S77 2017 Public opinion, legitimacy and Tony Blair's War in Iraq / | DS79.765.G7 S77 2017 Public opinion, legitimacy and Tony Blair's War in Iraq / | DS79.765.G7 U73 2011 Task Force Black : the explosive true story of the SAS and the secret war in Iraq / |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Includes bibliographical references (pages [270]-298) and index.
Ridiculous expectations -- Defeated, pure and simple -- Where's Helmand? -- A bleeding ulcer -- Dereliction of duty : the generals and strategy -- Cracking on: British military culture and doctrine -- Tactics without strategy? The counterinsurgency conundrum -- Doing no harm? The question of force -- Civvies -- Bad influences -- Opening networks.
Partly on the strength of their apparent success in insurgencies such as Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British armed forces have long been perceived as world class, if not world beating. However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as{u2014}at best{u2014}disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army. In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.