عرض عادي

Reducing alert rates of nuclear weapons / Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie ; UNIDIR, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

بواسطة:المساهم (المساهمين):نوع المادة : نصنصالناشر:New York ; Geneva : United Nations, 2012وصف:xiii, 53 pages : color illustrations ; 21 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • JZ5687 .K75 2012
Available additional physical forms:
  • Also available online.
المحتويات:
Executive summary -- Status and trend of nuclear alert forces -- Previous de-alerting initiatives -- Arguments for and against de-alerting -- Analysis of nuclear alert scenarios -- Conclusions.
ملخص:The nuclear-weapon states maintain nearly 2,000 warheads ready for use on short notice. Such alert levels vastly exceed security needs and undermine efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, nuclear arsenals. Alert leves are sustained by circular logic -- forces are on alert because there are forces on alert. While some argue that the de-alerting of nuclear forces would provoke dangerous instability, such judgments appeart to be deeply rooted in Cold War thinking. This study demonstrates that nuclear de-alerting is, in fact, feasible and achievable in a secure and stable manner.
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة JZ5687 .K75 2012 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010011079405

"UNIDIR/2012/6."

Includes bibliographical references (pages 40-52).

Also available online.

Executive summary -- Status and trend of nuclear alert forces -- Previous de-alerting initiatives -- Arguments for and against de-alerting -- Analysis of nuclear alert scenarios -- Conclusions.

The nuclear-weapon states maintain nearly 2,000 warheads ready for use on short notice. Such alert levels vastly exceed security needs and undermine efforts to reduce, and eventually eliminate, nuclear arsenals. Alert leves are sustained by circular logic -- forces are on alert because there are forces on alert. While some argue that the de-alerting of nuclear forces would provoke dangerous instability, such judgments appeart to be deeply rooted in Cold War thinking. This study demonstrates that nuclear de-alerting is, in fact, feasible and achievable in a secure and stable manner.

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