Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? / Timothy Lane, Steven Phillips.
نوع المادة :
نصالسلاسل:Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ; 28.الناشر:Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2002وصف:v, 15 pages : illustrations ; 23 cmنوع المحتوى:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 1589060881 (pbk)
- 9781589060883 (pbk)
- Does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders?
- HG3881.5.I58 E26 no. 28
- Also available in electronic form via Internet in English and Arabic.
| نوع المادة | المكتبة الحالية | رقم الطلب | معلومات المجلد | رقم النسخة | حالة | تاريخ الإستحقاق | الباركود | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
التقارير
|
UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات Reports Collection | مجموعة التقارير | HG3881.5.I58 E26 no. 28 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) | no. 28 | C.1 | Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط | 30010000393696 |
"This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--P. iii.
"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."-- Preface.
Also available in electronic form via Internet in English and Arabic.
