The Arms Trade and International Criminal Law : Reframing Accountability for Complicit Weapon Suppliers / Tomas Hamilton.

Cover -- Series -- The Arms Trade and International Criminal Law -- Copyright -- Contents -- Table of Cases -- Table of Primary Sources -- List of Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Arms Traders as Accomplices -- 1.3 Unpacking the Global Arms Trade: Items, Actors, Conduct -- 1.3.1 Types of 'Items' -- 1.3.2 'Actors' in the Arms Trade -- 1.3.3 'Arms Transfer Conduct' -- 1.4 The Arms Trade in International Criminal Law Scholarship -- 1.5 Overview of This Book -- 2. Complementing Export Regulation with Criminal Accountability -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 National Arms Export Regulations -- 2.2.1 National Export Criteria in Relation to International Crimes -- 2.2.2 The Netherlands: Unlawful Exports as Complicity -- 2.2.3 The UK: Challenging the 'Lawful' Trade -- 2.2.4 Export Regulations Are Constrained by Foreign Policy -- 2.2.5 Limitations to Specified Types of Item -- 2.2.6 Ineffective Brokering Regulation -- 2.3 International Agreements on the Arms Trade -- 2.3.1 The Arms Trade Treaty is Limited in Scope -- 2.3.2 International Agreements and Accountability for Atrocity Victims -- 2.4 Conclusion -- 3. 'Arms Trade Law' and the Potential of International Justice -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Arms Embargoes -- 3.2.1 Arms Embargoes Do Not Provide Criminal Accountability -- 3.2.2 Arms Embargoes Are Limited to Specific Categories of Item -- 3.2.3 Arms Embargoes Are Used Selectively -- 3.2.4 Integrating International Criminal Law and Arms Embargoes -- 3.2.5 Targeting 'Embargo Busters' Using International Criminal Law -- 3.3 The Plurality of 'Arms Trade Law' -- 3.3.1 The Law of State Responsibility -- 3.3.2 Law on the Use of Force -- 3.3.3 The Law of Neutrality -- 3.3.4 International Humanitarian Law -- 3.3.5 International Human Rights Law -- 3.3.6 Counter-​Terrorism Law -- 3.3.7 Other Subsidiary Areas of Arms Trade Law.

3.4 A Potential Role for International Criminal Law? -- 3.4.1 Limitations of Existing Arms Trade Law -- 3.4.2 Complicity in the 'Lawful' and 'Illicit' Arms Trade -- 3.4.3 Expressing the Seriousness of Complicity -- 3.4.4 Context and Content in an Expressive Prosecution -- 3.5 Conclusion -- 4. The Actus Reus of a Complicit Arms Transfer -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Complicit Assistance in the Rome Statute -- 4.3 Preliminary Remarks on Interpretation -- 4.4 The Quiet Primacy of Article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute -- 4.5 Basic Requirements of Article 25(3)(d)(ii) -- 4.6 'Significant' Arms Transfers (Degree of Contribution) -- 4.7 Causal Relationship with the Arms Transfer -- 4.8 Remoteness as a Useful Juridical Concept -- 4.9 The Significance of a Particular Shipment -- 4.10 Transferring Arms from Outside the Group of Perpetrators -- 4.11 Conclusion -- 5. The Mens Rea of a Complicit Arms Transfer -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Article 25(3)(c) Aiding or Abetting -- 5.3 Contributing to a Group Crime under Article 25(3)(d) -- 5.4 Specificity of Knowledge: 'Essential Matters' -- 5.5 Sources of Knowledge: Awareness of a UN Embargo or Fact-​Finding -- 5.6 Degree of Knowledge: 'Occurrence in the Ordinary Course of Events' -- 5.7 Aligning with Arms Trade Law: A Risk-​based Approach -- 5.8 Appropriate Labelling of Arms Transfer Complicity -- 5.9 Conclusion -- 6. Observing ICC Legal Culture on the Arms Trade -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Concept of 'Legal Culture' -- 6.2.1 Interpreting 'ICC Legal Culture' -- 6.2.2 Beyond 'Law versus Politics' -- 6.2.3 Identifying Legal Culture at the ICC -- 6.3 Frame 1: Obscuring the Arms Trade through an Arms Trade Law Lens -- 6.3.1 The ICC is Not a 'Regulator' of the Arms Trade -- 6.3.2 The Arms Trade is 'Already Regulated' -- 6.3.3 The ICC 'Must Defer to National Authorities'.

6.3.4 Delineating Frame 1: International Criminal Law's Role Seen as Distinct from Arms Trade Law -- 6.4 Frame 2: Excluding the Arms Trade Due to Pragmatic Constraints -- 6.4.1 Arms Traders Pose Dangerous Security Risks to the Court -- 6.4.2 Obtaining Evidence Would Be Exceptionally Challenging -- 6.4.3 Arms Trade Investigations Involve Complex Business Structures -- 6.4.4 Delineating Frame 2: Arms Trade Cases Not Seen as Pragmatic -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 7. Imagining the Arms Trade in ICC Case Selection -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 The Indeterminacy of Rules on ICC Case Selection -- 7.2.1 Case Selection -- 7.2.2 OTP Policy and Regulation 33 -- 7.2.3 Legal Reasoning for Not Selecting Arms Trade Cases -- 7.2.4 Weakly Articulated Legal Grounds -- 7.3 Legalism in ICC Case Selection -- 7.3.1 Concepts of 'Legalism' -- 7.3.2 Legalism versus Aspiration in ICC Case Selection -- 7.3.3 Cognitive Dissonance: Legalism versus Aspiration -- 7.3.4 Constructing Case Selection Decisions through ICC Legal Culture -- 7.3.5 ICC Legal Culture in the Narrowing of Actors Considered in Case Selection -- 7.4 Conclusion -- 8. Investigating the Arms Trade in the Second Congo War -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 A Case Study of the Second Congo War -- 8.3 Analysing Arms Flows in the Second Congo War -- 8.3.1 Background Levels of Arms Proliferation in the Great Lakes Region -- 8.3.2 Arms Transfers within the 'Pro-​DRC Alliance' -- 8.3.3 Arms Transfers from Rwanda and Uganda in the 'Anti-​DRC Alliance' -- 8.3.4 Weapons Followed Transnational Alliances -- 8.3.5 Arms Transfers from Outside the Great Lakes Region -- 8.3.6 The Pivotal Role of Arms Brokers -- 8.3.7 Linking Arms Transfers to Atrocity -- 8.4 Arms Export Regulation During the Second Congo War -- 8.5 Arms Embargoes During the Second Congo War -- 8.6 Politicization Critiques of Arms Embargoes.

8.7 The Panel of Experts: Resource Extraction and Arms Trafficking -- 8.7.1 The Resource Extraction Mandate -- 8.7.2 Initial Findings on Arms Supplies -- 8.7.3 Revising the Annexes -- 8.7.4 A New Mandate on Arms Trafficking -- 8.7.5 Implicating Rwanda and Uganda -- 8.8 Conclusion -- 9. Overlooking Arms Brokers in the ICC's Situation in the DRC -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Recognizing Potential Arms Trade Cases in the DRC Situation -- 9.3 Blind Spot 1: Politically Viable Arms Trade Cases -- 9.4 Blind Spot 2: Pragmatic Arms Trade Prosecutions -- 9.5 Blind Spot 3: Imagined Victims, Imagined Perpetrators -- 9.6 Blind Spot 4: Horizontal Selectivity -- 9.7 Conclusion -- 10. Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

This book offers a rigorous analysis of how the global arms trade intersects with accountability in the era of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Tomas Hamilton argues that individuals—including corporate executives, state officials, and arms traffickers—can be held directly accountable under international law for supplying weapons. Through case studies and legal analysis, the book critiques the limitations of current arms trade regulation and proposes how international criminal law can complement existing frameworks to prosecute complicit arms suppliers.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2025. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.