صورة الغلاف المحلية
صورة الغلاف المحلية
عرض عادي

Strategic Responsiveness : How Congress Confronts Presidential Power / Scott H. Ainsworth, Brian M. Harward, and Kenneth W. Moffett.

بواسطة:المساهم (المساهمين):نوع المادة : ملف الحاسوبملف الحاسوباللغة: الإنجليزية السلاسل:Legislative Politics and Policy Making Seriesالناشر:Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2025تاريخ حقوق النشر: 2025الطبعات:First editionوصف:1 online resource (215 pages)نوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • computer
نوع الناقل:
  • online resource
تدمك:
  • 9780472905010
الموضوع:النوع/الشكل:تنسيقات مادية إضافية:Print version:: Strategic Responsivenessموارد على الانترنت:
المحتويات:
Table Of Contents -- Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One. Unilateral Actions in a Separated System -- Chapter Two. Presidential Unilateralism and Congressional Control -- Chapter Three. A Theory of Strategic Responsiveness -- Chapter Four. The Evidence: Oversight and Presidential Unilateralism -- Chapter Five. Is Defense Policy Different? -- Chapter Six. Conclusion -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index
ملخص:Since the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism? Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach-- situated within legal and historical contexts--to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress can often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins keep occurring, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order.
قوائم هذه المادة تظهر في: Electronic Books | الكتب الإلكترونية
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Table Of Contents -- Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter One. Unilateral Actions in a Separated System -- Chapter Two. Presidential Unilateralism and Congressional Control -- Chapter Three. A Theory of Strategic Responsiveness -- Chapter Four. The Evidence: Oversight and Presidential Unilateralism -- Chapter Five. Is Defense Policy Different? -- Chapter Six. Conclusion -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index

Since the constitutional separation of powers often leads to delay or obstruction rather than coordinated policymaking, U.S. presidents are increasingly acting unilaterally to move policy. With the issuance of executive orders, signing statements, and policy memoranda, unilateralism has become a defining feature of the American presidency. Can Congress effectively use checks and balances to counter presidential unilateralism? Strategic Responsiveness takes a theoretically developed and empirically oriented approach-- situated within legal and historical contexts--to explore the system of separated powers. The authors find that Congress is not as weak as many perceive it to be and show how members of Congress can often anticipate individualized policy loss and choose to respond. These policy struggles shape the constitutional order as surely as broad, statutory constraints might. While the aggrandizement of the presidency and the usurpation of congressional control are not countered, ordinary policy losses are. For members and senators, presidential overreach is fine as long as the policy wins keep occurring, but policy losses may motivate members to reassert congressional prerogatives in policymaking through increased oversight. Strategic Responsiveness reveals how profoundly important policy-level disputes are in the politics of maintaining a particular constitutional order.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2025. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

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