RAF fighter squadrons in the Battle of Britain / Anthony Robinson.

Includes bibliographical references [279-281] and index.

The Battle of Britain - the first great battle between nations to be decided entirely in the air - was a struggle between very unequal opponents. The RAF's trained fighter pilots were inexperienced and in short supply; its fighter tactics were outmoded; and its most numerous fighter was inferior in both performance and number to that of the Luftwaffe. To overcome such handicaps in the heat of battle, the burden of responsibility fell upon the pilots and their squadron commanders. Many books have been written about the Battle of Britain; few have examined the course of the conflict from the point of view of the fighter squadrons themselves. Squadrons were the basic combat units in RAF Fighter Command; their combat effectiveness was a factor of crucial importance -transcending even the abilities of the brilliant individual pilots within the squadrons and the tactical and strategic skills of the senior commanders who deployed them. In theory, each squadron disposed of 16 aircraft and 26 pilots, numbers that were intended to maintain a formation of 12 fighters ready to take to the air. In fact, strengths varied considerably, as did equipment. RAF standard fighter tactics were outmoded - the RAF had far less combat experience than the Luftwaffe, whose pilots had already learned their aerial skills in Spain and Poland. Inexperienced in the tactics of fighter-versus-fighter combat, often inadequately equipped, the RAF fighter squadrons were compelled to improvise and learn new tactics as the battle raged and as the leaders emerged and matured. Meanwhile the chronic shortage of trained pilots inhibited the formation of new squadrons, hampered the rotation of units and circumscribed Fighter Command's tactics by enforcing a policy of economy of effort to conserve meagre resources. Before the outbreak of war, it had been expected that air power alone would be capable of devastating and decisive operations against population centres, tearing the will to resist from the nation; massive strikes wreaking overwhelming destruction were feared as all-too feasible. In the event, public morale proved more resilient. But the launching of air strikes from airfields so close to Britain as the Low Countries and France was less expected; the enemy could now come protected by short-range, but high-performance, fighter escort. To meet more than 800 of these formidable Messerschmitt Bf 109E fighters the RAF could field some 650 Hurricanes and Spitfires; of these, less than half - the Spitfires - would be able to fight on anything like equal terms. That the Battle of Britain was not won by courage alone emerges from the pages of this book, which examines the problems of tactics and leadership encountered by the RAF's fighter force when thrown into a battle for which it was less than adequately prepared. In an opening, wide-ranging chapter, the author, Anthony Robinson, considers the general course of the battle and the organization, tactics and equipment with which the RAF went to war. Thereafter he concentrates on the operations and experiences of eight squadrons heavily engaged in the battle, describing and analysing the events, decisions and circumstances of the daily encounters with German intruders. Meticulously researched from official documents and by consultation with many of the survivors of 'the few', RAF Fighter Squadrons in the Battle of Britain provides an illuminating new perspective on the greatest air battle of the Second World War.