Classics in game theory / edited by Harold W. Kuhn.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Foreword / H. W. Kuhn -- An Appreciation / David Kreps and Ariel Rubinstein -- 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games / John F. Nash, Jr. -- 2. The Bargaining Problem / John F. Nash, Jr. -- 3. Non-Cooperative Games / John Nash -- 4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game / Julia Robinson -- 5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form / F. B. Thompson -- 6. Extensive Games and the Problem and Information / H. W. Kuhn -- 7. A Value for n-Person Games / L. S. Shapley -- 8. Stochastic Games / L. S. Shapley -- 9. Recursive Games / H. Everett -- 10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments / R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg -- 11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf -- 12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler -- 13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders / Robert J. Aumann --

14. The Core of an n-Person Game / Herbert E. Scarf -- 15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model / John C. Harsanyi. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points / John C. Harsanyi. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game / John C. Harsanyi -- 16. The Big Match / David Blackwell and T. S. Ferguson -- 17. On Market Games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik -- 18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games / R. Selten.