عرض عادي

مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية

Iran : internal narratives and real security challenges / Thomas Lindemann.

مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية
بواسطة:Lindemann, Thomas [author].
المساهم (المساهمين):The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.
نوع المادة : نصنصالسلاسل:مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية السلاسل:Emirates lecture series: 108الناشر:مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية الناشر:Abu Dhabi : The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2013الطبعات:مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية الوصف:مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية الوصف:50 pages ; 21.نوع المحتوى:text نوع الوسائط: unmediated نوع الناقل:volumeردمك:9789948146933 (pbk); 994814693X (pbk); 9789948146940 (e-bk).تدمد:1682-1238.عنوان آخر: مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية العناوين الموحدة: مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الاستراتيجية الموضوع(موضوعات):Internal security -- Iran | Iran -- Foreign relations -- 1997- | Iran -- Politics and government -- 1997-مصادر على الخط المباشرPublisher description & Summary: ملخص:Why have Iranian actors displayed such aggressive behavior over the past decade, and especially since 2005? Why did Iranian perestroika fail? For a certain time now, Iranian behavior on the international scene has been characterized by military threats and deterrence postures, rhetorical intimidations of Israel, hints at military nuclearization, and assistance for 2revolutionary3 agitation in states with Shiite majorities. Many explanations have been offered for these variations in Iranian foreign policy behavior, such as profit motives, security opportunities brought about by the spread of technology, or 2American encirclement3 of Iran by troop deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. While these explanations have some merit, they do not answer some intriguing key questions: why is it that Iranian decision-makers declare themselves to be a great nuclear power and threaten Israel before actually being able to employ this nuclear deterrent? And why is Iran emphasizing nuclearization in spite of the high economic costs (e.g., in the form of sanctions) linked to this option? In contrast to other researchers, my analysis will elucidate these puzzles by giving more importance to narratives of 2self-aggrandizement3 in Iranian decision-making{u2014}by this I mean inflated presentations of one{u2019}s own cohesion and strength, employing strong images of the 2enemy.3 The creation of such myths has the function of re-invigorating the country`s decision-makers self-esteem while at the same time enhancing their internal legitimacy. As the re-evaluation of the 2self3 is not an isolated process, but related to other engaging actors, these myths also involve the demonization of other significant international actors (in this case, the United States). This study will establish and illustrate the co-variation between the US stigmatization of Iran and the radicalization of Iran{u2019}s internal narratives and foreign policy. The first part will outline the historical variations in Iranian foreign policy and its approach to international politics. In particular, it will argue that nuclear policy and rhetoric has been used to construct a positive self-image of an internationally isolated Iran. The second part will show that these chronological variations in internal Iranian narratives and foreign policy approaches are linked to the US and European framing of Iran, arguing that it is Iran{u2019}s stigmatization as a 2rogue state3 which has contributed to the rise of narcissistic self-descriptions that depict Western international powers as evil.
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نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات
General Collection | المجموعات العامة
DS318.83 L563 2013 (استعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010011297512
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات
General Collection | المجموعات العامة
DS318.83 L563 2013 (استعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.2 المتاح 30010011297515
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات
General Collection | المجموعات العامة
DS318.83 L563 2013 (استعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.3 المتاح 30010011297522
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات
General Collection | المجموعات العامة
DS318.83 L563 2013 (استعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.4 المتاح 30010011297531
مجموعة إصدارات المركز مجموعة إصدارات المركز UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات
ECSSR Display Collection | مجموعة إصدارات المركز
DS318.83 L563 2013 (استعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.5 لا يعار 30010011297506

"This publication is based on a lecture presented on May 08, 2013"--T.p. verso.

Why have Iranian actors displayed such aggressive behavior over the past decade, and especially since 2005? Why did Iranian perestroika fail? For a certain time now, Iranian behavior on the international scene has been characterized by military threats and deterrence postures, rhetorical intimidations of Israel, hints at military nuclearization, and assistance for 2revolutionary3 agitation in states with Shiite majorities. Many explanations have been offered for these variations in Iranian foreign policy behavior, such as profit motives, security opportunities brought about by the spread of technology, or 2American encirclement3 of Iran by troop deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. While these explanations have some merit, they do not answer some intriguing key questions: why is it that Iranian decision-makers declare themselves to be a great nuclear power and threaten Israel before actually being able to employ this nuclear deterrent? And why is Iran emphasizing nuclearization in spite of the high economic costs (e.g., in the form of sanctions) linked to this option? In contrast to other researchers, my analysis will elucidate these puzzles by giving more importance to narratives of 2self-aggrandizement3 in Iranian decision-making{u2014}by this I mean inflated presentations of one{u2019}s own cohesion and strength, employing strong images of the 2enemy.3 The creation of such myths has the function of re-invigorating the country`s decision-makers self-esteem while at the same time enhancing their internal legitimacy. As the re-evaluation of the 2self3 is not an isolated process, but related to other engaging actors, these myths also involve the demonization of other significant international actors (in this case, the United States). This study will establish and illustrate the co-variation between the US stigmatization of Iran and the radicalization of Iran{u2019}s internal narratives and foreign policy. The first part will outline the historical variations in Iranian foreign policy and its approach to international politics. In particular, it will argue that nuclear policy and rhetoric has been used to construct a positive self-image of an internationally isolated Iran. The second part will show that these chronological variations in internal Iranian narratives and foreign policy approaches are linked to the US and European framing of Iran, arguing that it is Iran{u2019}s stigmatization as a 2rogue state3 which has contributed to the rise of narcissistic self-descriptions that depict Western international powers as evil.

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