عرض عادي

Exploring terrorist targeting preferences / Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk, Melanie Sisson.

بواسطة:المساهم (المساهمين):نوع المادة : نصنصالناشر:Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2007]تاريخ حقوق النشر: copyright 2007وصف:xxii, 107 pages : illustrations ; 23 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 083303913X (pbk)
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • HV6432 L53 2007
موارد على الانترنت:
المحتويات:
What drives al Qaeda's choice of targets? -- Hypothesis testing: quantitative and qualitative measures -- Hypothesis testing: al Qaeda statements and expert observations -- Ramifications for al Qaeda attack planning in the United States.
ملخص:Al Qaeda, the jihadist network personified by Osama bin laden, seeks a restored caliphate free of Western influence. It uses terror as its means. But how does terrorism serve the ends of al Qaeda? Understanding its strategic logic might suggest what U.S. targets it may seek to strike and why. This monograph posits four hypotheses to link means and ends. The coercion hypothesis suggests that terrorists are interested in causing pain, notably casualties, to frighten the United States into pursuing favorable policies (e.g., withdrawing from the Islamic world). The damage hypothesis posits that terrorists want to damage the U.S. economy in order to weaken its ability to intervene in the Islamic world. The rally hypothesis holds that terrorism in the United States would be carried out to attract the attention of potential recruits and supporters. The franchise hypothesis argues that today℗s jihadists pursue their own, often local, agendas with, at most, support and encouragement from al Qaeda itself. Each of these four hypotheses was examined using an analysis of 14 major terrorist attacks, a structured survey given to terrorism experts, and an analysis of statements by al Qaeda. The monograph concludes that the coercion and damage hypotheses are most consistent with prior attack patterns, expert opinion, and the statements. The rally hypothesis appears to have weaker explanatory power. The franchise hypothesis coincides with the majority of post-9/11 attacks, but, unless such franchises are active in the United States, may not indicate what the next attack here might be.
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة HV6432 L53 2007 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010000089637

"MG-483."

Includes bibliographical references.

What drives al Qaeda's choice of targets? -- Hypothesis testing: quantitative and qualitative measures -- Hypothesis testing: al Qaeda statements and expert observations -- Ramifications for al Qaeda attack planning in the United States.

Al Qaeda, the jihadist network personified by Osama bin laden, seeks a restored caliphate free of Western influence. It uses terror as its means. But how does terrorism serve the ends of al Qaeda? Understanding its strategic logic might suggest what U.S. targets it may seek to strike and why. This monograph posits four hypotheses to link means and ends. The coercion hypothesis suggests that terrorists are interested in causing pain, notably casualties, to frighten the United States into pursuing favorable policies (e.g., withdrawing from the Islamic world). The damage hypothesis posits that terrorists want to damage the U.S. economy in order to weaken its ability to intervene in the Islamic world. The rally hypothesis holds that terrorism in the United States would be carried out to attract the attention of potential recruits and supporters. The franchise hypothesis argues that today℗s jihadists pursue their own, often local, agendas with, at most, support and encouragement from al Qaeda itself. Each of these four hypotheses was examined using an analysis of 14 major terrorist attacks, a structured survey given to terrorism experts, and an analysis of statements by al Qaeda. The monograph concludes that the coercion and damage hypotheses are most consistent with prior attack patterns, expert opinion, and the statements. The rally hypothesis appears to have weaker explanatory power. The franchise hypothesis coincides with the majority of post-9/11 attacks, but, unless such franchises are active in the United States, may not indicate what the next attack here might be.

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