عرض عادي

The secret war against Hitler / by William Casey.

بواسطة:نوع المادة : نصنصالناشر:London : Simon and Schuster, [1989]تاريخ حقوق النشر: copyright 1988وصف:xvi, 236 pages ; 24 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 0671699822 (hbk)
  • 9780671699826 (hbk)
الموضوع:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • D810.S7 C35 1989
ملخص: During World War II, Casey, the late CIA director, was a staff officer in the Office of Strategic Services' London branch, in charge of sending agents behind enemy lines. The most interesting passages in this bland account describe the difficulty of getting the high command to pay attention to information gathered by those agents. Casey regrets that the OSS, forerunner of the CIA, was unable to exploit the political advantages of the failed putsch against Hitler on July 20, 1944; he also bemoans the tardy penetration of Germany by OSS agents. In his opinion, the OSS "should have and could have" exploded the myth of the Bavarian redoubt, the Alpine retreat from which Hitler supposedly expected to fight on indefinitely. Casey's summary of OSS activities from 1943 to the end of the war in Europe is disappointingly reticent.
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة D810.S7 C35 1989 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010000257971

Map on lining paper.

Includes index.

During World War II, Casey, the late CIA director, was a staff officer in the Office of Strategic Services' London branch, in charge of sending agents behind enemy lines. The most interesting passages in this bland account describe the difficulty of getting the high command to pay attention to information gathered by those agents. Casey regrets that the OSS, forerunner of the CIA, was unable to exploit the political advantages of the failed putsch against Hitler on July 20, 1944; he also bemoans the tardy penetration of Germany by OSS agents. In his opinion, the OSS "should have and could have" exploded the myth of the Bavarian redoubt, the Alpine retreat from which Hitler supposedly expected to fight on indefinitely. Casey's summary of OSS activities from 1943 to the end of the war in Europe is disappointingly reticent.

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