عرض عادي

Cash incentives and military enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment / Beth J. Asch ... [and others].

المساهم (المساهمين):نوع المادة : نصنصالسلاسل:Rand Corporation monograph series ; MG-950-OSD.الناشر:Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corporation, 2010وصف:xxviii, 167 pages : color illustrations ; 28 cmنوع المحتوى:
  • text
نوع الوسائط:
  • unmediated
نوع الناقل:
  • volume
تدمك:
  • 9780833049667 (pbk)
  • 0833049666 (pbk)
الموضوع:النوع/الشكل:تصنيف مكتبة الكونجرس:
  • UB323 C35 2010
موارد على الانترنت:Available additional physical forms:
  • Also available in electronic form via the RAND Corporation Web site.
  • Also available via the Internet.
المحتويات:
Introduction -- Background on enlistment bonuses -- Methodology and data for the enlistment model -- Enlistment results -- Army attrition results -- Background on the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program -- Methodology and data for the Army reenlistment model -- Reenlistment results for all services -- Conclusions -- Appendix A. Detailed background on enlistment bonuses -- Appendix B. Detailed background on reenlistment bonuses -- Appendix C. Estimated reenlistment models, Army 24-MOS sample -- Appendix D. Estimated reenlistment models, all services -- Appendix E. Average SRBM, by occupation, all services -- Appendix F. Distribution of bonuses.
ملخص:This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments.
المقتنيات
نوع المادة المكتبة الحالية رقم الطلب رقم النسخة حالة تاريخ الإستحقاق الباركود
كتاب كتاب UAE Federation Library | مكتبة اتحاد الإمارات General Collection | المجموعات العامة UB323 C35 2010 (إستعراض الرف(يفتح أدناه)) C.1 Library Use Only | داخل المكتبة فقط 30010000018522

"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense."

"RAND National Defense Research Institute."

Also available in electronic form via the RAND Corporation Web site.

This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 165-167).

Introduction -- Background on enlistment bonuses -- Methodology and data for the enlistment model -- Enlistment results -- Army attrition results -- Background on the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program -- Methodology and data for the Army reenlistment model -- Reenlistment results for all services -- Conclusions -- Appendix A. Detailed background on enlistment bonuses -- Appendix B. Detailed background on reenlistment bonuses -- Appendix C. Estimated reenlistment models, Army 24-MOS sample -- Appendix D. Estimated reenlistment models, all services -- Appendix E. Average SRBM, by occupation, all services -- Appendix F. Distribution of bonuses.

Also available via the Internet.

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