After Clausewitz : German military thinkers before the Great War / Antulio J. Echevarria

Includes bibliographical references (pages 283-335) and index.

1. The Tactical Crisis -- 2. Initial Solutions -- 3. The Crisis Expands: Is War Now Impossible? -- 4. The Struggle for Resolution -- 5. A Tactical Synthesis: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War -- 6. Beyond Resolution -- 7. On War in the Present.

"The Kaiser's theorists have long been portrayed as narrow-minded thinkers rigidly attached to an outmoded way of war, little altered since Napoleon's time. According to this view, they ignored or simply failed to understand how industrialization and modernization had transformed the conduct of war. They seemed unaware of how numerous advances in technology and weaponry had so increased the power of the defensive that decisive victory had become virtually impossible.".

"But Echevarria disputes this traditional view and convincingly shows that these theorists - Boguslawski, Goltz, Schlieffen, Hoening, and their American and European counterparts - were not the architects of outmoded theories. In fact, they duly appreciated the implications of the vast advances in modern weaponry (as well as in transportation and communications) and set about finding solutions that would restore offensive maneuver to the battlefield."--BOOK JACKET.